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Abstract
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the
rm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters
for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-
specic. We study the case of completely relationship-specic investments
(i.e., the disagreement payo¤s do not depend on the investments). It turns out
that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment
incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specically, giving ownership to
party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment
decision and even when the owners expected disagreement payo¤ is larger
under A-ownership.
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1 Introduction
It is by now widely appreciated that the property rights approach to the theory
of the rm and the underlying incomplete contracts paradigm, which were
developed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart
(1995), are among the most important advances in microeconomics in the past
three decades.1
Consider two parties, A and B. According to the property rights approach,
ownership of a physical asset can foster a partys investment incentives. When
contracts are incomplete, the parties will divide the investments returns in
future negotiations. Ownership matters, because it improves a partys dis-
agreement payo¤ (i.e., the payo¤ that it could realize on its own) and hence
its future bargaining position. However, a crucial assumption of the property
rights approach is that investments are partly relationship-specic. The posi-
tive e¤ect that investments have on the surplus that the parties can generate
together is assumed to be larger than the e¤ect that the investments have on
the disagreement payo¤s; yet, the latter e¤ect must not be zero.
In contrast, in the present paper we focus on completely relationship-
specic investments; i.e., the investmentsreturns can be realized only within
the relationship between A and B. Since the investments do not a¤ect the
disagreement payo¤s, ownership would not matter in the standard property
rights setup, where information is assumed to be symmetric.
However, in contrast to the standard model, we assume that after the in-
vestment stage the owner of the asset privately learns his disagreement payo¤;
i.e., we allow for asymmetric information.2 We show that in this case owner-
1The incomplete contracts approach is the centerpiece of Oliver Harts work, who has
recently been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences together with Bengt Holmström
(cf. Nobel Prize Committee, 2016). Andrei Shleifer has emphasized that the Grossman-Hart
incomplete contracts approach represents perhaps the most inuential advance in economic
theory in the last thirty years(see the back cover of Aghion et al., 2016).
2Holmström (1999) already pointed out that the usual assumption according to which
both parties observe the disagreement payo¤s deserves more scrutiny. The fact that in the
standard model of the property rights approach bargaining is always ex post e¢ cient has
also been criticized by Williamson (2002). In the present paper, ex post ine¢ ciencies may
occur since bargaining takes place under asymmetric information, which moves the property
rights approach closer to transaction cost economics. For a model of ex post haggling, see
also the recent work by Mori (2017).
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ship matters, even when investments are completely relationship-specic. In
particular, we focus on a model in which only party A has an investment de-
cision. We show that nevertheless there are circumstances under which the
parties strictly prefer B-ownership, which may be the case even when the
expected disagreement payo¤ is larger under A-ownership.
Related literature. To my knowledge, completely relationship-specic in-
vestments have not yet been investigated in the literature on the property
rights approach to the theory of the rm. There are only a few papers that
study the role of asymmetric information in the property rights approach.3 In
Schmitz (2006), a party may gather private information about the fraction of
the collaboration surplus that it can realize on its own; hence, in contrast to
the present paper the disagreement payo¤ depends on the investment. In a
recent contribution by Su (2017), there is asymmetric information already be-
fore the ownership structure is chosen, while in Goldlücke and Schmitz (2014)
asymmetric information is learnt before the investment stage but after the al-
location of ownership. In contrast, in the present paper the owner learns his
private information after the investment stage.4
2 The model
Consider two risk-neutral parties, A and B. At some future date t = 2, the
parties can by collaboration generate a surplus V + i  0. For instance, party
A may be the seller of an intermediate good that can be used by party B
in order to produce a nal good. Producing the intermediate good requires
access to a unique physical asset.5 At date t = 0, the parties agree on an
ownership structure o 2 fA;Bg. If there is integration (o = A), then party A
controls the asset, so it can use the asset without party Bs consent. If there
3In addition, there are some papers that analyze how ownership rights should be allocated
in adverse selection models building on Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983); see e.g. Samuelson
(1985), McKelvey and Page (2002), and Matouschek (2004). Yet, these papers do not
consider investments and hence are less related to the property rights approach developed
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
4Note that there are also several papers on asymmetric information in hold-up problems
that do not study the role of property rights, see Goltsman (2011) and the literature discussed
there.
5The asset may be a specic machine or a building (cf. Hart, 1995). For simplicity, we
do not model any assets that might be needed to produce the nal good.
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is non-integration (o = B), then party B has control over the asset. At date
t = 1, party A can make an observable but non-contractible investment i  0
in its human capital; the investment costs are given by 1
2
i2. Finally, at date
t = 2 the parties bargain over whether or not to cooperate.
Following the incomplete contracting literature, at date t = 0 the par-
ties agree on an ownership structure that maximizes their expected total sur-
plus.6 The ownership structure determines the partiesdate-2 disagreement
payo¤s (i.e., their payo¤s when they do not cooperate). Departing from the
standard property rights model, we assume that the investment is completely
relationship-specic; i.e., the investment is lost when the parties fail to collab-
orate at date t = 2.
Suppose rst that party A is the owner of the asset (o = A). If the parties
do not collaborate at date t = 2, party A gets only vA 2 f0; V g, where pA =
PrfvA = V g 2 (0; 1), while party B gets zero (since it has no access to the
essential asset). Hence, party A might be able to produce a nal good without
party Bs human capital, but it is ex ante uncertain whether or not it can do
so.
Next, suppose that party B is the owner (o = B). Then at date t = 2
party As disagreement payo¤ is zero, since it cannot access the asset that is
essential to produce the intermediate good. Party Bs disagreement payo¤ is
vB 2 f0; V g, where pB = PrfvB = V g 2 (0; 1). Thus, party B might be able
to produce an intermediate good without party A, but it is initially uncertain
whether or not party B can do so.
Under symmetric information, according to the Coase theorem the parties
would always agree to collaborate at date t = 2, which is ex post e¢ cient. Yet,
in contrast to the standard property rights model, we assume that there may
be asymmetric information. In particular, vA and vB are random variables,
which are realized at date t = 1:5. When there is asymmetric information, then
at date t = 1:5 only party A learns the realization of vA under A-ownership,
while only party B learns the realization of vB under B-ownership.7
We consider the following date-2 bargaining game. With probability  2
6See Hart (1995). The parties can divide the expected total surplus with a suitable lump-
sum payment. Apart from that, no other contractual arrangements can be made at date
t = 0.
7Apart from the realizations of the random variables, all elements of the model are
common knowledge.
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(0; 1) party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to party B, while otherwise
party B can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to party A.8
The rst-best solution. In a rst-best world, at date t = 2 the parties
always collaborate. Moreover, at date t = 1 party A chooses the investment
level iFB = 1, which maximizes the total surplus V + i  1
2
i2.
3 Symmetric information
Suppose the parties are symmetrically (un)informed; i.e., either both parties
learn the realization of the owners disagreement payo¤ at date t = 1:5, or no
one does.
Consider A-ownership. At date t = 2, with probability  party A can
make a take-it-or-leave it o¤er. Party A then o¤ers to collaborate and to keep
the whole date-2 surplus V + i, which will be accepted by party B since its
disagreement payo¤ is zero. When party B can make the o¤er, it proposes to
collaborate if party A accepts to get vA (if both parties know the realization
of vA) or pAV (if no party knows the realization of vA ). The o¤er will be
accepted by party A, because it gets its (expected) disagreement payo¤. In
any case, party As expected date-1 payo¤ reads
(V + i) + (1  )pAV   1
2
i2:
Thus, party A will invest iA =  and the total surplus is
SA = V +    1
2
2:
Under B-ownership, party As expected date-2 payo¤ is V + i  pBV when
party A can make the o¤er, while it is 0 otherwise. Hence, party As expected
date-1 payo¤ reads
((1  pB)V + i)  1
2
i2:
Therefore, party A will invest iB =  and the expected total surplus is
SB = V +    1
2
2:
8This simple bargaining game has often been used in the related literature, see e.g. Hart
and Moore (1999, p. 135). In fact, it is the simplest non-cooperative bargaining game
consistent with the standard property rights model. To see this, note that if the parties are
symmetrically informed, the game leads to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where
 is party As bargaining power.
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Proposition 1 If the parties are symmetrically (un)informed, then party A
invests io =  and the expected total surplus is So = V +    1
2
2, regardless
of the ownership structure o 2 fA;Bg.
Under symmetric information ownership does not matter, since the invest-
ment is completely relationship-specic.9
4 Asymmetric information
Suppose now only the party who owns the asset learns the realization of its
disagreement payo¤ at date t = 1:5.
Consider A-ownership. At date t = 2, party A can make the take-it-or-
leave it o¤er with probability . Party A then proposes to cooperate and to
keep the total date-2 surplus V + i, which will be accepted by party B, whose
disagreement payo¤ is zero. When party B can make the o¤er, it proposes
to collaborate if party A agrees to get A, which party A accepts whenever
A  vA. Maximizing its expected payo¤, party B sets
A = argmax(V + i  ) PrfvA  g:
Observe that A will be either 0 or V . Specically, party B prefers A = V
whenever the condition i  (1   pA)(V + i), or equivalently i  1 pApA V , is
satised.
If i  1 pA
pA
V , then at date t = 1 player As expected payo¤ is
uA(i) = (V + i) + (1  )V   1
2
i2
and player Bs expected payo¤ is (1  )i. If i < 1 pA
pA
V , player As expected
payo¤ reads
wA(i) = (V + i) + (1  )pAV   1
2
i2
and player Bs expected payo¤ is (1 )(1 pA)(V + i). Observe that uA(i) >
wA(i). Note that both uA(i) and wA(i) are maximized by i = , so party
A will invest either i =  or i = 1 pA
pA
V . When   1 pA
pA
V , or equivalently
pA  VV+ , it is optimal for party A to invest ~{A = . Now consider the case
9Moreover, note that (i) there is never overinvestment compared to the rst-best bench-
mark and (ii) when party As bargaining power  goes to one, the rst-best outcome will be
achieved.
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pA <
V
V+
. In this case, there must exist a critical value ~pA 2 (0; VV+ ) such
that it is optimal for party A to invest ~{A =  for pA < ~pA and to invest
~{A = 1 pA
pA
V for pA  ~pA.10
Hence, the expected total surplus under A-ownership is
~SA =
8><>:
V + (1  (1  )pA)    122 if pA < ~pA;
V + 1 pA
pA
V   1
2
(1 pA
pA
V )2 if ~pA  pA < VV+ ;
V +    1
2
2 if V
V+
 pA:
Next, consider B-ownership. At date t = 2, party A can make the o¤er
with probability . In this case, party A o¤ers to collaborate if party B agrees
to get B, which party B accepts whenever B  vB. To maximize its expected
payo¤, party A sets
B = argmax(V + i  ) PrfvB  g:
Thus, party A sets B = V whenever the condition i  (1   pB)(V + i)
is satised, which can be rewritten as i  1 pB
pB
V . Otherwise, party A sets
B = 0. When party B can make the o¤er, it proposes to cooperate and to
keep the total date-2 surplus V + i, which will be accepted by party A, since
its disagreement payo¤ is zero.
At date t = 1, player As expected payo¤ is
maxfi; (1  pB)(V + i)g   1
2
i2.
Party Bs expected payo¤ is V + (1   )(V + i) if i  1 pB
pB
V , and pBV +
(1  )(V + i) otherwise. Let us dene a critical value
~pB = V=   (1 + V 2=2)1=2 + 1:
Maximizing its expected payo¤, party A invests ~{B =  if pB  ~pB, and it
invests ~{B = (1  pB) otherwise.11
10To see this, note that f(p) := uA(
1 pA
pA
V )  wA() is strictly negative for p su¢ ciently
small, f( VV+ ) > 0, and f(p) is strictly concave for pA 2 (0; VV+ ).
11To see this, observe that if  < 1 pBpB V , party A invests i = (1  pB) and sets B = 0.
Now suppose   1 pBpB V . If party A invests i =  and sets B = V , its expected payo¤
is 12
2. Yet, if (1   pB) < 1 pBpB V , it might also invest (1   pB) and set B = 0, so its
expected payo¤would be (1 pB)(V +(1 pB))  12 (1 pB)22. The latter decision is more
protable if pB < ~pB : Note that this condition can be satised only if (1  pB) < 1 pBpB V ,
and the condition is always satised if  < 1 pBpB V .
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As a consequence, the expected total surplus under B-ownership reads
~SB =
(
V + (1  pB) (1  pB)    12(1  pB)22 if pB < ~pB;
V +    1
2
2 if pB  ~pB:
Proposition 2 Consider the case of asymmetric information. Under A-owner-
ship, there exists a critical value ~pA 2 (0; VV+ ) such that party A invests ~{A = 
if pA < ~pA or if pA  VV+ , while it invests ~{A = 1 pApA V >  otherwise. The ex-
pected total surplus is given by ~SA. Under B-ownership, party A invests ~{B = 
if pB  ~pB, while it invests ~{B = (1  pB) <  otherwise. The expected total
surplus is given by ~SB.
Thus, under asymmetric information ownership matters, even though the
investment is completely relationship-specic.12 Our ndings are illustrated in
Figures 1, 2, and 3, where V = 1 and  = 1=2.
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Figure 1. The expected total surplus under A-ownership given asym-
metric information ( ~SA), compared to the symmetric-information (SA)
and rst-best (SFB) benchmarks.
12Moreover, note that (i) under A-ownership there can be overinvestment compared to
the rst-best benchmark and (ii) when party As bargaining power  goes to one, the rst-
best result is attained under A-ownership, while under B-ownership the rst-best outcome
is achieved only if pB  V   (1 + V 2)1=2 + 1.
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Figure 1 shows the expected total surplus under A-ownership. If pA is
smaller than ~pA, the investment level is the same as under symmetric informa-
tion (~{A = ). Yet, when party B makes the o¤er, party A will reject it with
probability pA, so there is an ex post ine¢ ciency which becomes more severe
when pA becomes larger. If pA lies between ~pA and VV+ , party A invests more
than it would do under symmetric information (~{A = 1 pA
pA
V > ) in order to
get a better o¤er from party B. In this case, ex post e¢ ciency will always be
attained.13 If pA is larger than VV+ , party A makes the same investment as
under symmetric information and ex post e¢ ciency is achieved.
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Figure 2. The expected total surplus under B-ownership given asym-
metric information ( ~SB), compared to the symmetric-information (SB)
and rst-best (SFB) benchmarks.
Figure 2 displays the expected total surplus under B-ownership. If pB is
smaller than ~pB, party A invests less than it would do under symmetric in-
formation (~{B = (1   pB) < ) and there is an ex post ine¢ ciency with
13Observe that there is overinvestment with regard to the rst-best benchmark (iFB = 1)
when pA lies between ~pA and 1=2, while there is underinvestment when pA is larger than
1=2.
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probability pB. If pB is larger than ~pB, party A chooses the same invest-
ment level as under symmetric information (~{B = ) and ex post e¢ ciency is
attained.
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Figure 3. The optimal ownership structure given asymmetric informa-
tion.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal ownership structure depending on pA and pB.
Recall that under symmetric information, the parties would always be indif-
ferent between the two ownership structures. Under asymmetric information,
this is the case if pA is larger than VV+ and pB is larger than ~pB. However, B-
ownership is strictly better than A-ownership if pA is smaller than ~pA and pB is
larger than ~pB. Moreover, B-ownership is optimal if pA is smaller than ~pA and
pB is su¢ ciently small.14 In all other parameter constellations, A-ownership is
optimal.
14Note that in this parameter constellation, the investment level is smaller under B-
ownership (~{B = (1   pB)) than under A-ownership (~{A = ), so B-ownership can be
optimal only if an ex post ine¢ ciency is su¢ ciently more likely under A-ownership. This
observation explains why B-ownership can be optimal even when pA > pB , i.e. when the
expected disagreement payo¤ is larger under A-ownership.
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